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Malaysia, Zimbabwe and Peru are chosen to be analyzed in detail
within a Research Project that aims to evaluate how policies
including agricultural pricing policies, trade policies and ex-
change rate policies - in developing countries affect their agri-
cultural sectors. For each of these countries, the empirical
investigation is introduced by a descriptive part containing a
survey of the agricultural sector and its policy environment.
This paper provides the respective survey for Peru.
Peru can roughly be divided into three distinct geographical
zones: The Coast, the Sierra and the Selva. The Coast is a belt
of arid land between the foothills of the Andes and the Pacific
Ocean. About half of Peru's population of about 20 million people
live in this region. Its agriculture mainly consists of large and
technically advanced commercial farms, in which two of Peru's
most important export crops, sugar and cotton, are produced.
Other main agricultural commodities grown at the Coast are rice,
potatoes and yellow maize. Coastal agriculture is heavily de-
pendent on irrigation facilities. The Sierra is made up of val-
leys and the western plateaus of the Andean montains. It is the
home of most of the Peruvian indians, who are mainly engaged in
traditional subsistence agriculture. Among other things, they
produce wheat, potatoes, white maize and beans on relatively poor
soils. Large livestock haciendas are also located in the Sierra.
The Selva is the largest region (comprising 63 per cent of the
Peruvian territory), but is only weakly populated. It consists of
two subregions: the subtropical high Selva (700-1800 meters) and
the tropical low Selva (below 700 meters). Many Selva inhabitants
live in agricultural villages near rivers and carry on slash-and-
burn agriculture. The Selva has abundant land suitable for culti-
vation, but the soil is shallow and acid. Major crops of the
region are rice, yellow maize and coffee, one of Peru's most
important export crops.Against the background of this geographical setting the present
paper deals with the performance of the country's agricultural
sector and the effects of agricultural as well as macroeconomic
policies during the last 40 years. The presentation is divided
into three parts. First, the period 1950-1968, which shows Peru
as a fairly outward-oriented economy, is considered in subsection
2.1. Particularly in the 1950s, the country was characterized as
a liberal economy with growth mainly led by traditional agricul-
tural exports (Thorn and Bertram [1978]). In the mid-1960s, it
started to follow an import substitution strategy. Second, sub-
section 2.2 deals with the military rule between 1968 and 1979.
The militaries intended to reduce Peru's dependence on volatile
world markets and foreign capital and extended the state partici-
pation in the economy. With respect to agriculture, a profound
land reform was the dominating event of that period (Kennedy
[1983]). Third, the state of the economy (and in particular the
agricultural sector) in the 1980s is analyzed in section 3. The
decade began with a liberalization program under President Be-
launde. However, the worldwide recession and adverse climatic
conditions complicated the adjustment process and the government
returned to more protectionist policies. President Garcia, who
came into office in 1986, followed import substitution policies
for both, agriculture and industry, at the detriment of the whole
export sector (World Bank [1989]) .2. Historical Survey
2.1. Peru; An Open Market Economy (1950-1968)
In the 1950s, the agricultural export sector was the driving
force for Peru's economic development. Namely sugar and cotton
were the leading foreign exchange earners, accounting for about
50 per cent of the total value of Peruvian exports (Roemer
[1970], p. 44). Both commodities are nearly exclusively produced
at the Coast on large estates and under advanced levels of tech-
nology (Coutu and King [1969]). Favourable international prices
and a critical world supply situation during the Korean War led
to a wave of investment for export crops, especially into irriga-
tion projects. The following worldwide output expansion caused
excess supply and downward pressure on prices. In the case of
sugar, the introduction of the International Sugar Agreement in
1953 prevented a dramatic price decrease, while the US Government
kept world cotton markets in equilibrium by buying up surpluses.
Thus, markets for Peruvian export crops were consistently favour-
able during the 1950s and the response was a rapid output expan-
sion, leading to an increase in the value of export crop pro-
duction of nearly 400 per cent between 1950 and 1960 (Table 1).
By contrast, Peru's non-export food crops performed very poorly.
Production figures in Table 1 indicate a stagnating value of
production and a per capita drop in food crop output of almost 20
per cent over the decade. These different developments reveal the
characteristic dual nature of the Peruvian agricultural sector:
On the one hand, irrigated coastal production of industrial and
commercial food crops in large and modern estates, on the other
hand, highland production of livestock on large farms at a rela-
tively low technological level and of subsistence foodstuffs by
small-scale peasant farmers.Altogether, the domestic food shortages during the 1950s could be
met by large-scale food imports, which were possible without
creating balance-of-payment problems because of the abundant
inflow of foreign exchange for agricultural exports.
In the 1960s, the situation changed somewhat. The world cotton
market again suffered from over-supply, aggravated by the steady
inroads made by synthetic textiles into markets previously domi-
nated by cotton. As a result, relative cotton prices decreased
Table 1 - Peruvian Agricultural Production, 1950-1975
Output (billions














































Source: Fitz Gerald (1979, p. 73).ed and land was switched to other crops. Between the early six-
ties and the early seventies the area under cotton was halved and
production fell by over one-third. Sugar production profited from
the Cuban Revolution in 1959, which led to a reduction of Cuba's
sugar quota in the US market, while Peru received a quota large
enough to absorb all of the available exportable supply and could
sell sugar at the premium prices prevailing in the USA. Coffee,
which is grown in the Selva, expanded very fast and became the
third significant export crop during the 1960s. Nevertheless, the
decline of cotton caused a drop in the overall export crop pro-
duction from 1960 to 1967 (Table 1). The increase in food crop
production over the same period was mainly due to the fact that
the land taken out of cotton was devoted to food crop production
(Thorp and Bertram [1978]). Despite this reallocation towards the
domestic market, per capita food output did not even reach the
1950 level.
The expanding mining sector (copper) and the fishmeal industry,
that experienced an enormous boom in the 1960s, substituted the
traditional agricultural products cotton and sugar as the key
contributors to the expansion of the export economy and delivered
most of the foreign exchange necessary to finance the still large
food imports (Thorn and Bertram [1978]).
2j:ij.2_1_Agricultural_and_General_Economic_PolicY
Beginning with the administration of General Odria (1948-1956)
and continued under Prado (1956-1962), Peru followed deliberate
laissez-faire economic policies, at least in the Latin American
context. This orientation was also reflected in its dealings with
the agricultural sector. Public investment in agriculture as a
percentage of central government expenditure averaged approxi-
mately 4.2 per cent between 1950 and 1959 (Kennedy [1983]). This
little public support was largely concentrated on large-scale,
coastal production as can be illustrated by the disbursement of
credit by the agricultural development bank (Table 2). ExportTable 2 - Distribution of Agricultural Credit by the Banco
Agrario del Peru (BAP)
Percentage Distribution by Crop Destination
8
1950 1962 1968
Export crops (coffee, cotton,
sugar) 65.1





























































Excludes loans for forestry and livestock,
Source: Kennedy (1983, p. 16).crop producers received about two-third of the public credits
and, even more striking, 93 per cent of the public funds went to
the coastal region. The latter figure does not only include cred-
its for sugar and cotton, but also for rice, the non-export food
crop that received the most public support. Similar allocation
patterns did also apply to fertilizers and technical assistance.
Pricing policies (controls and consumer subsidies) were partly
removed in the 1950s. Officially, only bread prices remained
controlled, but additional inofficial controls governed the sale
of rice, meat and other foodstuffs of high demand in the urban
markets.
Altogether, the government contributed to the dual structure of
Peru's agriculture, although one has to keep in mind that it did
only slightly intervene in the economy during the 1950s.
In the following decade, government's involvement in the agricul-
tural sector substantially increased. On average, 28 per cent of
public investment were designed for agriculture with emphasis
laid on irrigation projects and the colonization of new land,
particularly in the Selva (Kennedy [1983]). The distribution of
credits between export crop and food crop producers became gra-
dually more equal (Table 2). In 1964, the Belaunde (1963-1968)
administration implemented a limited land reform in response to
peasant militancy. However, the reform law contained numerous
loopholes and exemptions and thus had little impact on the over-
all system of land tenure (Thorp and Bertram [1978]).
The rapid growth of Peruvian exports (the average annual growth
rate between 1948 and 1968 was 8.3 per cent) was also affected by
general economic policies, particularly exchange policy. The
Odria government abolished exchange controls and set the sol free
to fluctuate in 1950. Depreciation of the sol was tolerated and
occasionally even assisted by the Central Bank. In contrast, when
the danger of appreciation occured, the Central Bank intervened
to peg the rate in favour of the exporters (Frankman [1974]). Thedevaluations of 1953 and 1958-59 both followed declines in the
prices of agricultural and mining exports and brought about gains
for the export sector at the expense of investment levels and
imports of capital goods.
Trade policy was not very important during the 1950s. At the end
of the decade, Peru had by far the lowest tariff level of all
Latin American countries with an average rate of 34 per cent,
while this rate was 138 and 112 per cent for Chile and Columbia,
respectively (Macario [1964]).
The Industrial Promotion Law, which finally passed Congress in
1959, marked a turning point of Peruvian economic policy-making,
indicating a movement towards import-substitution strategies. It
provided incentives for investment by means of exemptions from
import duties on equipment and intermediate goods and provision
for tax-free reinvestment of profits. The law benefited industry
in general, not only selected industries as in other Latin Ameri-
can countries. Tariff policy was modified to promote manufactured
goods; higher duties on final goods combined with exemptions
under the Industrial Promotion Law led to massive increases in
effective protection for import-substituting industries. Pharma-
ceutical products, for example, had 18 per cent effective protec-
tion in 1963 and 164 per cent in 1965 (Thorp and Bertram [1978]).
This meant a severe discrimination of the primary sector. Agri-
cultural and mining exports were additonally affected by the
fixing of the nominal exchange rate between 1959 and 1967.
In the mid-1960s, a slowdown of export growth and increasing
imports of capital goods worsened the current account deficit,
which was financed by increases in government foreign borrowing,
thus raising debt service payments. Additionally, the Belaunde
government increased public investment as compared to its prede-
cessors. All these facts contributed to a balance-of-payments
crisis. In August 1967, the sol was depreciated by 42 per cent,
import controls were imposed and deflationary measures taken. Asa result, the current account improved, but the economy exper-
ienced a recession (Thorn and Bertram [1978]). This opened the
way for a military coup by General Velasco in October 1968, whose
period of office is the subject of the next chapter.
2.2. The Peruvian Experiment (1968-1979)
One of the first actions of the military government under General
Velasco was the introduction of an agrarian reform program, which
was going to be the focus of agricultural policy throughout the
1970s. Major objectives of the land reform were to redistribute
land resources in order to create jobs and increase rural incomes
as well as to increase productivity through more intensive land
utilization (Kennedy [1983]). Over and above that it contained an
important political component. By means of the land reform the
military regime intended to crush the power of the landlord
oligarchy and to gain the support of the rural labor force.
The Peruvian land reform was and has remained the most comprehen-
sive and radical one in Latin America. All landholdings above a
certain size (150 hectares at the Coast and 15 to 55 hectares in
the Sierra) were expropriated without exception (Lastaria-Corn-
hiel [1989]). Most of the expropriated land was redistributed to
newly formed production cooperatives. The so-called 'cooperativas
agrarias de produccion' (CAPS) substituted crop-producing estates
(mainly located at the Coast) and the permanent workers of these
estates became cooperative members. The 'sociedades agricolas de
interes social
1 (SAIS) replaced the former large livestock ha-
ciendas (mainly in the Sierra) and were to include former hacien-
da workers as well as members of the surrounding peasant communi-
ties. The remainder of the land (about 30 per cent) was distri-
buted among existing peasant cooperatives and individual peasant
farms (Minkner [1979]) .
Although the agrarian reform was quite far-reaching, there re-
mained a significant number of middle-sized commercial farms as10
Table 3 - Land Distribution Before and After the Agrarian Reform
Before Reform After Reform
% Land Owned in:
Units > 100 ha 45.0 1.5
Units < 100 ha
but > 20 ha 9.2 8.3
minifundistas





and reform peasant com-
munities) 35.2 33.8
number of landless
peasant families 381200 224000
Although only a small percentage of the land, this represented
approximately 92 per cent of all farm units.
Source: Melmed (1987, p. 21).
well as minifundistas and landless peasants (Table 3). The real
beneficiaries of the land redistribution were the former perma-
nent estate workers.
In spite of the change in land tenure, agricultural production
followed the same trends which had become evident during the
1960s. The export crop production was almost stagnant in the
1970s. In addition, the two traditional export commodities, sugar
and cotton, faced an increasing internal consumption, which fur-
ther diminished their role as foreign exchange earners. At the
end of the decade, coffee had become the leading export crop.
Food production again recorded a dismal performance after the11
slight recovery in the late 1960s, when coastal land was shifted
from cotton and to food crops. Production figures in per capita
terms declined and were significantly below the 1950 level in
1975 (Table 1). Within the group of food crops there appeared to
be differences between commodities mainly produced for urban
consumers (e.g. coastal rice), which performed rather well, and
commodities for the rural market, which showed negative growth
rates. Agricultural production as a whole grew at an average rate
of only 0.1 per cent between 1970 and 1980 (World Bank [1989]).
The heterogeneous performance of individual foodstuffs originated
from the government's philosophy. It followed an import substitu-
tion strategy and intended to assure sufficient food for the
growing urban labor force. Consequently, production incentives
had to be created. Particularly coastal rice farmers profited
from irrigation projects and credit facilities. The state also
took over the milling and marketing of rice in order to guarantee
the provision of this staple for urban markets. In contrast, the
subsistence farmers in the Sierra did not receive significant
governmental support. Nearly all funds were offered to the large
cooperatives including the export crop producers. The latter were
promoted (with little success) in order to gain foreign exchange,
which was needed for industrial development. With this policy the
military regime - contrary to its announcements to reduce inequa-
lity - preserved the dualism between modern coastal and primitive
highland agriculture.
Pricing policies were heavily discriminating against domestic
farmers for all import-competing foodstuffs (including
1 rice). The
internal prices of wheat and rice, for example, were only about
half the international price in 1975 (Figueroa [1981]) . The main
government objective was to provide cheap food especially for the
urban population. Moreover, imports of agricultural products were
subsidized. Together with the stagnation of exports this led to a
US$ 135 million deficit in the trade balance for agricultural12
products starting from a US$ 118 million surplus in 1970 (World
Bank [1989]).
Altogether, the agricultural policy measures taken by the Velasco
government (including the land reform) caused no fundamental
change in agricultural output and productivity compared to the
1960s. The investment level in agriculture did not increase. The
state became more and more involved in the agricultural sector
(as well as in the whole economy), but at the expense of private
activities. The commercialization of nearly all foodcrops was
centralized. For this purpose two marketing boards were founded:
ECASA (rice marketing) and ENCI (marketing of inputs and other
agricultural products).
In 1975, a combination of stagnant exports, a decline in export
prices, heavy dependence on food imports and industrial interme-
diate goods, and a rapid increase in the burden of foreign debt
caused a balance-of-payments crisis. General Velasco was removed
in August that year and General Morales Bermudez became the new
president. From 1976 to 1978 the Peruvian economy experienced a
recession. Agricultural production stagnated in 1977 and declined
by 3 per cent in 1978. By mid-1978 the government embarked on a
stabilization program, which was supported by an IMF stand-by
agreement, a loan from the World Bank and considerable debt re-
lief (Bogdanowicz-Bindert [1983]) . The program led to a slight
economic recovery and a rapid improvement of the balance-of-pay-
ments. The agricultural sector continued to perform weakly, main-
ly because pricing policies continued to discriminate against do-
mestic farmers and technical services still worked very poorly
(World Bank [1981]) .Bibliofrhek
des Instituts fur Weltwirtschafa
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3. The 1980s
3.1. General Economic Trends
When Fernando Belaunde Terry became President for the second time
in 1980, he profited from the successful stabilization program
implemented by the preceding government, which had brought about
an economic recovery and a favorable balance-of-payments posi-
tion. Nevertheless, he inherited a country with strong social
problems that had just experienced a severe economic crisis. GDP
per capita was still below the 1974 level (Table 4). President
Belaunde continued the import liberalization program, that had
been initiated by his predecessor and started to transfer state
companies to private ownership. On the other hand, public invest-
ment was increased, especially for infrastructural projects (Mann
and Pastor [1989]).
In 1980 and 1981, the Peruvian GDP grew by 4.7 and 5.5 per cent,
respectively (Table 5). Declining terms of trade, the worldwide
recession, an overvalued exchange rate and limited access to
external funds as a result of the Peruvian debt overhang led to
an economic stagnation in 1982. In the following year, the situa-
tion was further aggravated by the 'El Nino' stream that caused
floods in the North and droughts in the South of Peru (World Bank
[1989]). Consequently, GDP declined by 12.3 per cent in 1983. In
addition, inflation rose steadily. The government reacted with a
reversal of the import liberalization process and took measures
to stabilize the economy (especially exchange rate depreciation
and reduction of public expenditures). It achieved a recovery of
the current account through a sharp decline in imports (Table 6),
but could not overcome inflationary pressures and had to accept
low economic growth (1.5 per cent in 1985).
In August 1985, the social democrat Alan Garcia won the presiden-
tial election. The new government adopted a heterodox policy mix
to stabilize the economy (Corsepius [1989]) . Its strategy con-
tained at least three major elements. First, the exchange rate
was devalued and then fixed, prices were frozen, interest rates14





























































































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1990,15
Table 5 - Real GDP and Per Capita Real GDP, Growth Rates, 1961-
1988







































Figures are unweighted averages.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Table 4
Table 6 - Balance of Payments (Million US$), 1975, 1980-1988
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Merchandise
Exports fob 1291 3916 3249 3293 3015 3147 2978 2531 2661 2694
Merchandise
Imports fob 2389 3090 3802 3721 2722 2140 1806 2596 3182 2750
Trade Balance
8 -1099 826 -553 -428 293 1007 1172 -65 -521 -56
Current Account
1
1 -1541 -101 -1733 -1612 -875 -223 135 -1077 -1481 -1138
Change in.
Reserves 499 -609 632 65 -2 -297 -124 411 855 -63
Minus sign indicates debit. - Minus sign indicates increase.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1990.16
were reduced (to lower working capital costs) and dollar deposits
were frozen ('de-dollarization'). These measures were supposed to
break inflationary expectations. Second, real wages and agricul-
tural incomes were raised and public works programs were initiat-
ed in order to achieve demand led growth. The strategy was based
on the belief that there were large unutilized capacities that
would make possible reactivation without inflation. In addition,
a wide range of imports were banned to encourage the use the
slack capacities in local industry. Third, Garcia announced a
limit for debt service payments (10 per cent of export revenues),
because he needed the funds for his development plan.
At the beginning, the heterodox stabilization package appeared to
be very successful. Real GDP grew by 10 per cent in 1986 and 7.8
per cent in 1987 and the inflation rate was declined from 158.3
per cent in 1985 to 62.9 per cent in 1986 (World Bank [1989]). On
the negative side, two major drawbacks of the strategy became
apparent (Mann and Pastor [1989]). In the first place, the fiscal
deficit could not be controlled, which forced the inflation rate
to increase again in 1987. Second, the exchange rate freeze led
to a real appreciation of the Inti in 1986. Imports expanded
(also because of the rise in domestic absorption) and exports
declined. Consequently, the trade balance and the current account
deteriorated (Table 6) and international reserves became scarce
as a result of very low fresh capital inflows, which could not
offset the current account deficit.
By the end of 1987, the Peruvian economy experienced severe capa-
city constraints and thus the demand led growth model did not
work any longer. The economy fell back into a recession (GDP
declined by 8.5 per cent in 1988), inflation accelerated and real
wages declined. With annual inflation rates of 1722 per cent in
1988 and 2775 per cent in 1989 the country moved into a period of
hyperinflation (Blomeier [1990]).
Altogether, the 1980s were characterized by strong economic fluc-
tuations. The overall economic performance was dissatisfactory as17
can for example be illustrated by the GDP per capita figure in
1988, which merely equalled the 1966 level (Table 4).
3.2. The Agricultural Sector
Agriculture still plays an important (although declining) role in
the Peruvian economy. Presently, it employs nearly 40 per cent of
the labor force and contributes about 11 per cent to GDP. After a
decade of stagnation the sector experienced moderate growth in
the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1987 agricultural GDP grew at an
average rate of 3.3 per cent. Growth rates were somewhat higher
during the Garcia office (3.8 per cent in 1986, 6.1 per cent in
1987 and 5.5 per cent in 1988 in spite of the general economic
crisis) than under President Belaunde. This can be explained by
the favorable agricultural pricing policies of the Garcia govern-
ment (see subsection 3.3) and by certain peculiarities, which
impaired the agricultural performance in the early 1980s. First,
the coastal cooperatives, which were founded during the agrarian
reform, began to be decollectivized by means of giving small
parcels (usually 4-6 hectares) to former CAP members (Carter and
Alvarez [1989]). The chaotic course of this parcellation brought
agriculture into an organizational crisis. Second, the 'El Nino'
stream caused a 9.6 per cent decline of the sectoral GDP in 1983.
Production figures for Peru's major individual agricultural com-
modities are presented in Table 7. Among the export crops, sugar
cane production was lower and coffee production higher in the
1980s as compared to the previous decade, while cotton showed no
clear trend. Food production for the domestic market was more or
less stagnant over the whole period. Only rice experienced- an
upward trend since 1981 with record harvests in 1984 and 1987.
For all commodities except cotton one can observe a steep fall of
production in 1980 (the year of transition from the military
regime to a new civilian administration) and all commodities
except rice suffered from the 'El Nino' stream in 1983.18




































































































































































All figures are measured in metric tons
Source: BCR, Memoria, various issues.19
Peru's traditional agricultural export commodities have lost
their special importance meaning for the economy. Presently,
sugar, coffee and cotton together contribute less than 10 per
cent to the total merchandise exports. Since 1976, coffee has
been the most important export crop (Table 8). On the other hand,
Peru became a net importer of sugar in 1983 (Boiling [1989]).
Since then, sugar exports were only made in order to take ad-
vantage of the premium prices offered within the US sugar quota.
Imports of the main Peruvian staples (wheat, rice and maize) were
subject to considerable fluctuations. In the case of rice, Peru
was self-sufficient in most years of the 1970s, but has again
become dependent on imports since 1979.
While Peru had considerable surpluses in the agricultural trade
account especially in the 1950s and 1960s, import expenditures
exceeded export revenues by far throughout the 1980s. Thus, agri-
culture has lost its role as a net foreign exchange earner.
3.3. Effects of Aqricultural Policies
Out of several instruments of direct agricultural support which
are available, price policy and credit policy are discussed in
the following.
Agricultural price policies are usually directed at two different
target groups, namely consumers and producers. Since the former
want low food prices and the latter as high revenues as possible,
it is difficult for an intervening government to satisfy both
groups.
The Velasco regime gave priority to the provision of cheap food
for the urban population at the detriment of the farmers, who
obtained prices, which were substantially below world market
equivalents. The newly founded parastatal organisations ECASA20















































































































































All figures are million US$.
Source: Export values are taken from BCR (various issues) and
imports values from Boiling (1989).21
(for rice) and ENCI (for other grains) were responsible for the
marketing of the foodstuffs.
General Bermudez and later on President Belaunde took efforts to
liberalize agricultural prices. Price controls on meat and vege-
tables, for example, were removed in 1980 and farm wheat prices
were decontrolled in 1983 (Boiling [1989]). ENCI lost its monopo-
poly trade power for all agricultural products, while ECASA kept
it for rice. In 1984, inflationary pressure forced the government
to interrupt its liberalization program and to keep a lot of
prices under control. As a result, pricing policies still tended
to discriminate against domestic producers. This - together with
relatively low tariffs for agricultural commodities and an over-
valued exchange rate (see subsection 3.4) - is reflected in nega-
tive Effective Protection Rates for all major crops except wheat
and barley by mid-1984 (Table 9). Rice and yellow maize in the
Selva received higher protection than at the Coast because of a
transport subsidy granted to the Selva producers within a program
to develop agriculture in remote areas.
As president Garcia came into office, the objectives of agricul-
tural pricing policies changed fundamentally. Whereas consumers
were still to be subsidized, the new government intended to fol-
low an import substitution strategy not only for industrial, but
also for agricultural commodities. Consequently, production in-
centives were given by means of higher guaranteed prices for food
crops. In addition, ENCI offered agricultural inputs (particular-
ly fertilizers) at low prices. Producers of export crops, by
contrast, did not receive guaranteed prices (Herrmann [1989]).
The resulting incentive structure is revealed by the Effective
Protection Rates for 1987. It clearly hurts the export crops
cotton and coffee, while the import-competing agricultural prod-
ucts are treated favorably.22
Table 9 - Effective Protection Rates for Selected Crops (Per
cent), 1984 and 1987
Yellow Pota-
























Exchange rates are adjusted by assuming a 40 per cent overvalua-
tion of the Sol vis-a-vis the US-dollar. - The exchange rate
used for the computation is the purchasing power parity rate. -
The reported figures refer to production at the Coast. The re-
spective protection rates for the Selva are 25 per cent for maize
and -34 per cent for rice. - The reported figures refer to the
internal market. The respective protection rates for the foreign
market are -18 per cent for cotton and -34 per cent for coffee.
Source: 1984 rates are taken from World Bank (1985, p. 32) and
1987 rates from World Bank (1989, p. 91).
The co-existence of consumer subsidies, which were mainly concen-
trated on rice and wheat, and supported producer prices led to
large deficits in the trading accounts of the parastatals ENCI
and ECASA. Consumer subsidies appeared to be extremely expensive,
because they were granted to the whole population regardless of
the individual need. A more selective distribution of subsidies
among the poorest population groups (e.g. the campesinos in the
Sierra) would have relieved the governmental budget substanti-
ally.
Public agricultural credits are disbursed by the development bank
'Banco Agrario del Peru' (BAP). Since 1970, BAP almost continu-
ously charged negative real interest rates. The subsequent losses
were covered by the government.
Soon after its inauguration, the Garcia government introduced a
preferential credit line (with low nominal interest rates) for
farmers through Banco Agrario and interest rates were scaled down23
in several steps (Table 10). As a result, real interest rates for
agricultural credits became even more negative and the governmen-
tal subsidy for BAP further increased.
The effects of charging negative real interest rates are twofold:
On the one hand, cheap credits lower the production costs of
farmers and make agriculture more profitable. On the other hand,
negative interest rates have also unwelcome effects. First, high
credit subsidies lead to an excess demand for credits (credit
demand decreases and the availability of real financial savings
declines), which makes necessary a credit rationing system. In
Peru, less than 10 per cent of the farmers had access to public
credits, most of them being cotton and rice producers. Since this





































































aMaximum annual effective rates. - Interest rate on credit line of Banco
Agrario. - Consumer price inflation of previous quarter in annual terms.
Source: World Bank (1989, p. 80).24
farmers in general belonged to higher-income groups, the credit
subsidy was regressive in terms of income distribution among the
rural population. Moreover, exactly the same farmers, who ob-
tained subsidized credits, were also favored by public invest-
ment, which was still mainly directed to irrigation projects.
Second, negative interest rates discourage private banks from
providing funds to agriculture.
3.4. Effects of General Economic Policies
Since the early 1960s, Peru has followed import substitution
strategies. High protection for industry relative to other sec-
tors started during the first Belaunde office. The inward-looking
philosophy was even more pronounced under General Velasco, who
intended to reduce Peru's dependence on volatile world markets
and foreign capital. Between 1978 and 1982 the economy exper-
ienced a liberalization period, which brought about a consider-
able reduction of import restrictions. The average tariff rate
(including surcharges) decreased from 66 per cent in 1978 to 32
per cent in 1981 (World Bank [1989]). Balance of payments pro-
blems caused a return to more protectionist policies in 1984.
This trend was continued by the Garcia administration. As a con-
sequence, the average legal tariff rate had risen back to the
1978 level in 1987.
Table 11 shows a tariff pattern, that is typical for a country
following an import substitution strategy. Manufactured goods
receive the highest tariff protection and, within the manufactur-
ing sector, consumer goods with low value added shares are pro-
tected most, at the expense of the agricultural and the mining
sector.
Industrial protection has an indirect effect on agriculture via
changes in relative prices. Imposing a tariff on imported indus-
trial goods raises the relative price between import-competing
(protected) industrial goods and nontradables (e.g. food crops)25
as well as the relative price between nontradables and export-
ables (e.g. export crops). Thus, increasing protection levels for
manufactured goods are partly shifted to the agricultural sector
as an implicit tax, which is higher for export crops than for
food crops. Herrmann et al. (1990) estimated that in the period
1980-1985 around 13 per cent and 9 per cent of total taxes for
Peruvian coffee and cotton were due to indirect discrimination
via industrial protection.
Table 11 - The Legal Tariff Structure, December 1987
unweighted average
(per cent)








Source: World Bank (1989, p. 71).
Since import substitution in industry leads to a real apprecia-
tion (i.e. the relative price between tradables and nontradables
declines), the whole export sector is discriminated. To overcome
this anti-export-bias, the Garcia government established several
export incentives, among which the most important were: (i) a
temporary admission system, which granted exemptions from tariffs
and sales taxes on imported raw materials and intermediate prod-
ucts, if they were used for export production; (ii) a direct ex-
port subsidy (CERTEX); and (iii) subsidized export credits (FENT)
(Hanel [1987]). Since all these incentives were only destined to
non-traditional exports, traditional agricultural exports were
again discriminated.26
An important instrument of Peru's macroeconomic policy is the
exchange rate. Between 1978 (when the IMF stabilization program
was implemented) and 1985 the Sol was gradually devalued under a
crawling peg system. However, real appreciations and the subse-
quent overvaluation of the currency could not be avoided.
At the beginning of the Garcia administration the commercial and
the higher financial rate were devalued by 18 per cent and held
fixed after that. In August 1985, multiple exchange rates were
introduced, which allowed transactions either at the financial or
at the official rate or at an ad hoc weighted average of both.
The original intention of the multiple exchange rate system was
to promote non-traditional exports by granting favorable rates
(Table 12). One year later, the system was extended to imports.
Since September 1986, so called 'priority' imports, which in-
cluded the staples maize and wheat, could be traded at the over-
valued official exchange rate. This meant an import subsidy for
food, which sharply contradicted the government's announcement to
substitute food from abroad by import-competing crops. In the
following, the system became more and more complicated, culminat-
ing in a total number of nine different exchange rates. In view
of dramatic real appreciations the government returned to a
crawling peg system for the two benchmark rates (official and
financial) in December 1986 and carried out several discretionary
devaluations later on.
With respect to agriculture, multiple exchange rates in Peru
caused a further discrimination of the traditional export crops
and counteracted the endeavors to reduce import dependence on
food. Moreover, they have negative implications for the economy
as a whole. First, multiple exchange rates contain implicit sub-
sidies and taxes and thus lead to efficiency losses. Second, they
interact with tariffs and trade taxes. The resulting complexity
of incentives opens the way for inconsistencies. Finally, grant-
ing low rates for imports and high rates for exports is a source
of exchange losses.27
Table 12 - Exchange Rate Structure for Trade Transactions, 1985-1988
Type of Transactions
















1. Wheat, maize, medicines,
dairy, edible oil
2. Fertilizers and seeds
3. Low grade beef and life-
stock
4. Raw material
5. Paper and tractors
6. High grade beef
7. Priority capital goods
8. Consumer goods, non-
essential imports and
capital goods
















































































Total number of rates
13.9 17.5 29.0 54.9 74.3 125.0 125.0
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 131.0
17.5 29.0 54.9 74.3 125.0 209.0
13.9 18.7 40.0 77.0 100.1 131.0
15.9 22.4 40.0 77.0 100.1 131.0
15.9 21.0 40.0 77.0 100.1 131.0
15.9 20.0 40.0 77.0 100.1 131.0
15.9 19.1 40.0 77.0 100.1 131.0
19.2 26.8 42.0 77.0 100.1 131.0
19.2 29.0 42.0 97.9 127.3 166.7
5 9 9 9 4 6
Source: World Bank (1989, p. 61).28
4. Summary and Conclusions
It was the objective of this paper to describe the performance of
the Peruvian agricultural sector in the last 40 years and to
discuss the effects of agricultural and general economic poli-
cies. The following major findings can be summarized:
1. Peru's export crop production performed very well during the
1950s. Traditional agricultural exports were the main source
of economic growth in that period. The boom was encouraged by
laissez-faire economic policies and a flexible exchange rate
regime. In addition, public investment was almost exclusively
directed to irrigation projects for the coastal export crops
cotton and sugar. In the 1960s, the situation of export agri-
culture deteriorated due to two main reasons: first, relative
cotton prices decreased and land was taken out of cotton and
switched to other crops. Second, the government began to fol-
low an import substitution strategy. The subsequent over-valu-
ation of the Peruvian currency caused a general anti-export-
bias, which remained prevalent in the following decades. In
the 1970s, when import substitution policies became even more
pronounced, the agricultural export sector lost its leading
role for the economy. A short liberalization period between
1978 and 1982 could not reverse this trend. Since 1985, Peru's
export crops have faced a twofold discrimination: they have
been taxed by pricing policies and have received an unfavor-
able rate within the multiple exchange rate system, which was
introduced in August 1985.
2. Peru's non-export food crops showed a poor performance nearly
throughout the period under consideration. The situation was
characterized by declining per capita output figures and large
scale food imports. Among other things, this can be explained
by price disincentives for producers (cheap price policies)
and by the missing access to credits and technical support
especially for small farmers. A short recovery of food crop
production was observable in the mid 1960s, when former cotton29
land was dedicated to food crops. Under the military regime
certain agricultural commodities (particularly rice), which
were important for the nutrition of the urban labor force,
were promoted as a part of the import substitution strategy.
The Garcia government extended import substitution to food
crops by giving price incentives to farmers, who cultivated
import-competing agricultural commodities. However, this meas-
ure was counteracted by a preferential exchange rate granted
for food imports, which in turn increased the import depend-
ence .
The overall negative development of Peru's agricultural sector
since 1950 has several reasons, of which the most important are:
Limited arable land for a growing population;
adverse natural conditions (e.g. the 'El Nino' stream in
1983);
highly regulated prices (cheap food policies at the detriment
of the farmers);
inefficient credit policies (discouraging private investment
by charging negative real interest rates);
policy inconsistencies (e.g. export crops receive most of the
available credit but are heavily discriminated by other policy
instruments);
an industrial import substitution strategy.30
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